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Abstract
In South Asia, Muslim reformers have often attempted to ‘rationalize’ and
gentrify the everyday behaviour of ordinaryMuslims. Yet, despite the existence of
discussions of contraceptive techniques in the yu¯na¯n-¯ı tibb curricula of19th century
India and the apparent affinity between rationalism and fertility regulation,
contraception was rarely discussed in public debates involvingMuslim reformers.
In this paper we discuss some of the relationships between e´lite debates among
Muslim leaders and the grassroots behaviour of villagers in rural Bijnor, in
western Uttar Pradesh. Villagers’ voices are ambiguous, with fears for mother
and child health surfacing as often as concerns for religious orthodoxy and one’s
destiny in the afterlife. In addition, many of the villagers’ views of Islam were
much more restrictive than those of the locally accepted authoritative voices:
although the staff at Daru’l ‘Ulu¯m, Deoband, saw much modern contraception
as an unwelcome sign of modernity, their discussions of the acceptability of
family planning circled round notions of majbu¯r¯ı [compulsion], repentance, and
the unfathomable mercy of Allah. We conclude that focusing on local notions of
Islam to understand the fertility behaviour of rural Muslims is less fruitful than
considering a “political economy of hopelessness” that, increasingly since 1947,
affects many Muslims in north India.
During our first research in Jhakri, an exclusively Muslim village in
Bijnor district (north-western Uttar Pradesh), the sterilization drive
associated with the Emergency of 1975–1977 was a recent memory.
Our field-notes, then and subsequently, have repeatedly registered the
conviction that using contraceptive techniques, especially sterilization
[nasband¯ı or ‘tube closing’], is contrary to Islam.1 Recent surveys
1 This paper draws particularly on our research in Bijnor district on education
(including madrasahs) with Craig Jeffrey in 2000–2003 funded by Economic and
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elsewhere in India indicate that 9% of currently married Muslim
women—but only 1% of Hindu and Christian women—say that their
main reason for not intending to use contraception is because it is
‘against their religion’. For Bhat and Zavier, these figures reflect
Muslims’ slavish obedience to ignorant mullahs and account for most
of the differences in contraceptive use between members of the three
communities (Bhat and Zavier 2005: 400). Islamic doctrines are
widely presumed to be central toMuslims’ everyday lives. Superficially,
Jhakri residents might seem to endorse this rarely examined or
substantiated assumption, but leaving matters there would fall far
short of adequately accounting for their fertility behaviour.
First we outline how several aspects of Muslim reformers’ agendas
might seem consistent with fertility limitation, yet the historical
record provides no clear impression of their views on contraception.
Further, the idea that Muslims slavishly follow a monolithic ‘Islamic
doctrine’ ignores the contested and shifting understandings of
contraception yielded by the same authoritative Islamic sources. With
this backdrop, we outline how most women in Jhakri assert that
sterilization is contrary to Islam—yet almost in the same breath
also complain about poverty and their inability to rear and educate
numerous children properly. Moreover, whilst teachers at village
madrasahs and senior clerics at the influential Daru’l ‘Ulu¯m seminary
at Deoband generally take a restrictive view of contraception, Muslim
villagers who oppose contraception (especially sterilization) take a
harder line still. Nevertheless, we must situate the fertility behaviour
of rural Muslims in north India in the wider social, political and
economic contexts within which they are struggling to make their way
in the world—the standard demographic practice for people of other
Social Research Council (R000238495), Ford Foundation and Royal Geographical
Society; and in Jhakri in 2003–2005 funded by Wellcome Trust (GR067231).
Earlier research was funded by Economic and Social Research Council in 1982–
1983, 1985 (G00230027 and G00232238) and Hayter Fund; in 1990–1991 by
Overseas Development Administration and Rockefeller Foundation. We thank them
for their support; none bears any responsibility for what we have written here. We
also thank the people of our study villages and our research assistants, Swaleha
Begum, Zarin Rais, the late Radha Rani Sharma, Chhaya Sharma, Shaila Rais, and
Manjula Sharma. Our thanks also to Filippo and Caroline Osella, participants at the
Muslim Reform workshop in SOAS in 2005, and Sanjam Ahluwalia, Guy Attewell,
Rachel Berger, Markus Daechsel, Joyce Flueckiger, Sarah Hodges, Laura Jeffery,
Justin Jones, Fareeha Khan, Siobhan Lambert-Hurley, Adil Mehdi, Barbara Metcalf,
GailMinault, Dietrich Reetz, Barbara Ramusack, Francis Robinson, Yoginder Sikand,
Mrinalini Sinha, Muhammad Qasim Zaman. For more details on our Bijnor research,
see Jeffery et al. (1989); Jeffery and Jeffery (1997); Jeffery and Jeffery (1996).
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faith communities. ‘Islamic doctrine’ and clerical pronouncements
alone provide a poor basis for interpretingMuslims’ fertility behaviour
in contemporary India.
Muslim reform and contraception
Muslim reformers in South Asia have long debated what Islamic
doctrine decrees for its adherents and what practices constitute
un-Islamic accretions. A succinct account is virtually impossible,
for the debates were often heated and the conclusions reached
were diverse (Metcalf 1982; Reetz 2006; Robinson 2001; Sanyal
1996). One recurrent theme, however, is individual responsibility for
salvation, which can be ensured through the performance of good
actions in this world. Thus Muslim reformers have exhorted ordinary
Muslims to learn what is required and to ‘rationalize’ their everyday
behaviour (Daechsel 2004; Metcalf 1984, 1993, 1994b, 1996, 2004;
Zaman 1999). For reformers, education was key to eradicating
the ‘backwardness’ to which many e´lite Muslims considered their
brethren were prone (Seth 2006). And, whether with respect to
bodily discipline, manners, clothing and speech, moral purification
and domestic cleanliness, or living according to a strict daily schedule,
women as homemakers, wives and mothers are central in Muslim
reform agendas (Daechsel 2006; Jeffery et al. 2004, 2005, 2006;
Metcalf 1990, 1994a, 1999; Minault 1998; Winkelmann 2005a,
2005b). Tabligh¯ı writers are not alone in seeing this ‘inner struggle to
discipline and moral purification’ as the greater jiha¯d (Metcalf 2004:
274).2 These efforts, moreover, strikingly parallel the class projects
of non-Muslim reformers attempting to ‘gentrify’ poor illiterates
by purging their ignorant habits; the view that education was the
means of achieving this; and educated women’s responsibility to create
domestic orderliness and rear children for whom bodily discipline and
‘civility’ was second-nature (Gooptu 2001; Gupta 1998, 2002; Joshi
2001; Walsh 2004).
At the very least, contraception might seem to have an elective
affinity for the reform agenda and ‘rationalized’ everyday life,
especially as Muslim reformists’ disciplining regimes did not include
sexual abstinence within marriage. Szreter et al. characterize a
2 Tabligh¯ı Jama‘at is aDeoband-inspired proselytisingmovement to appriseMuslims
of their core religious duties. See Metcalf (1993; 1996; 1999); Sikand (2002).
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demographic orthodoxy in which ‘the planning of families is somehow
umbilically tied to the modernization of society’ (Szreter et al. 2003:
145) and widespread contraceptive usage occurs only when people’s
lives approximate to ‘modernity’. Before that, people tend to say
that conception is ‘up to God’ or a matter of ‘fate’, something that
is not (and should not be) subject to human intervention. With
‘modernity’, people’s views and behaviour shift from fatalism to
imagining the possibility of family planning. And what demographers
generally see as quintessential trademarks of ‘modernity’—disciplined
bodies, regulated domestic life and so forth—find their echoes in
Muslim reform. Would not the good Muslim life be more attainable
if women’s devotion to domestic and religious duties, attention
to their children’s educational progress, and investment in their
children’s education and wellbeing are not undermined by repeated
childbearing? Rather surprisingly, however, Muslim reformers do
not seem to have recommended fertility limitation or birth spacing.
Historians of Muslim reform in the late colonial period rarely even
mention contraception, whilst historians working on contraceptive
debates have generally not examined documents written by Muslim
reformists. Yet, we would contend, viewing Muslim reform in South
Asia through the lens of contraception would give new leverage over
our puzzles in this paper.
The Qur’a¯n Shar¯ıf contains no more than implicit discussion of
contraception and had¯ıs do not provide a consistent view. In the pre-
modern period, judgements were reached through ijtiha¯d [interpretive
thinking] by religious experts, based on ijma¯ [consensus] and qiya¯s
[analogical reasoning]. Human fallibility in interpreting God’s will
provided scope for legitimate disagreement and for reaching different
conclusions in good faith. Over time, schools of jurisprudence
and individual Muslim scholars reached differing conclusions about
contraception (Omran1992; Sachedina1990). Yet themain schools of
jurisprudence all considered contraception permissible, if sometimes
blameworthy and disapproved [makru¯h]. A person’s motives [n¯ıyat]
are crucial for gauging the permissibility of their actions (Katz
2003: 43, 45): conflicting yet apparently inviolable principles required
compromises and ‘necessity’ could be the trump card (Bowen 2003:
57).
Musallam’s survey of legal, medical and erotic literatures inMuslim
west Asia up to the 19th century lists suppositories, ointments, coitus
interruptus or ‘azl, but not surgical contraceptive techniques (Musallam
1983). As Musallam comments, this presumes neither efficacy nor
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widespread use of contraceptive techniques.3 Nevertheless, Muslim
reformers in 19th and 20th century South Asia had access to an
array of textual materials discussing contraception, some of which
featured in yu¯na¯n-¯ı tibb curricula in South Asia (Guy Attewell, personal
communication 7 June 2006; Zillurrahman 1994). But were they
taught in full (and why, then, is the secondary literature so silent
about them)? Or had they been abridged to exclude references to
contraception (and if so why)?Or had they been bypassed by reformers
intent on returning to (supposedly) authenticated texts dating from
an earlier period than the material Musallam cites?
Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi (1864–1943), for instance, is
renowned within the reform literature because of his advice manual
Bihisht¯ı Zewar (Metcalf 1990). He did not discuss contraception there,
but in a collection of fatwa¯ he said that the use of contraception
is permissible only if there is a ‘legitimate excuse’ [‘uzr sahih], as
when a woman is weakened by repeated childbearing.4 Although the
‘legitimate excuse’ gives some interpretive flexibility, contraception
is generally not permissible—in other words, hardly an enthusiastic
endorsement.
On the other hand, as Islam moved towards increasingly narrow
views of the shari‘a as invariant and exact, new artefacts and ideas
considered of western origin could be deemed unacceptable, because
they were not legitimized by the shari‘a and other authoritative texts
(Zaman 2002).5 Hostility to contraception might reflect that change
(MuhammadQasim Zaman, personal communication, 22May 2006).
Certainly,Muslim clerics, amongmany others, often perceived aspects
of contemporary western gender politics—such as women’s entry
into paid employment—as profoundly immoral. For Syed Abul A’la¯
Maudu¯d¯ı (1903–1979), contraception and freely available abortion
were a western plot to spawn sexual promiscuity and social disorder
3 Musallam also notes that attributing agency to people in pre-modern Islamic
societies challenges themodernist demographic orthodoxy that presumes pre-modern
fatalism.
4 We thank Fareeha Khan for this reference (Maulana Ashraf ‘Ali Thanawi’s
fatwa¯ collection, Imdad al-fatawa, Dar ul-Uloom Karachi six-volume edition, Volume 4,
pp. 202–205) (personal communication, 24May 2006).
5 Messick discusses a similar shift in Yemen towards more rigid and codified
versions of the shari‘a under the modernising pressures of colonising powers (Messick
1993: 34). By contrast, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and colleagues involved in the Aligarh
movement were generally positively inclined towards western science and technology,
although the secondary literature does not discuss contraception: Ahmad (1967: 31–
56); Lelyveld (1978).
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in which women’s focus on domestic duties would be undermined
(Maudu¯d¯ı 1968; Maudu¯d¯ı 1972; both originally published in Urdu).6
The arithmetic of communal politics and Muslim anxiety about
minority status could also mesh with hostility to contraception (Justin
Jones, personal communication, 27 May 2006). By the 1920s, a
‘common wisdom’ about Muslim fertility was already in play (Jeffery
and Jeffery 2006). Proto-Hindutva writers insistently made shrill
claims that Hindus would soon be outnumbered by Muslims (see
Cohn 1987; Datta 1999; Gupta 2002). It would be puzzling if
Muslim reformersmadeno equally vociferous replies: in other debates,
Muslim e´lites intervened on the representation of different religious
communities in public bodies, trying to preserve or restore their
earlier over-representation; Muslim theologians also resisted shuddh¯ı
campaigns [‘purification’, or ‘re-conversions’ to Hinduism] (Dietrich
Reetz, personal communication, 11 May 2006; cf. Reetz 2006: 148–
151).7
The ‘rationalizing’ tendencies of Muslim reform—domestic order
and cleanliness—might have pointed towards contraception. Horror
at western immorality or the communal numbers game, though,might
have pushed in another direction. Quite probably, Muslim e´lites in
the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries adopted diverse positions
on the subject (Sanjam Ahluwalia, personal communication 20 May
2006).8 The relative silence of the historical record is intriguing,
though, given how politically contentious contraception is in India
today. In the contemporary period, few Muslim clerics have advocated
family planning and Khan suggests that sterilization is not actively
endorsed by any school of Islamic jurisprudence (Khan 1979: 184–
191). Yet there are diverse views about when contraception may be
permissible.
6 Although not a trained cleric, Maudu¯d¯ı was central in Jama‘at-e Islami and his
writings have had widespread influence: Ahmad (1967: 208–223); Bowen (2003);
Karim (2005: 50ff.); Mahmood (1977: 107–127); Nasr (1994).
7 Western licentiousness and concerns about ‘numbers’ also figure on the global
stage: at the 1994 UN International Conference on Population and Development in
Cairo, some Muslim delegates (and others from the global south), saw abortion, in
particular, as a threat to morality and a means by which western governments and
development agencies were trying to limit Muslim populations: Bowen (1997); Katz
(2003); McIntosh and Finkle (1995); Petchesky (1995).
8 Contraceptive debates touched on many other issues: eugenics and ‘racial’
decline, age of consent, child marriage, gender politics, reproductive health, and
the furore generated by the publication of Mother India; see Hodges (2006); Mayo
(1998); Ramusack (2006); Sinha (1998); Whitehead (1996).
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For instance, the late QadiMujahid al-IslamQasimi (once chief qa¯z¯ı
of the Muslim Personal Law Body in Bihar and Orissa and executive
member of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board) asserted that
contraception is not normally permissible. It should be adopted only
under very stringent conditions, including the mother’s health and
spacing children so that they could be reared properly, but excluding
women’s professional or social concerns and fear of being unable to
feed one’s children. Sterilization is almost always forbidden, because it
‘destroys the power of reproduction’ and ‘renders awoman incapable of
conceiving’ (Qasimi 2003–2004). Shaykh Faraz Rabbani, a Deobandi
sympathizer of South Asian descent who works in Amman, argues that
having children is important in Islam, but also that modern kinds of
contraception are akin to ‘azl [coitus interruptus]. They may be used
if there are ‘sound reasons’—including wanting a manageable family
size, lacking support of extended families in childrearing, wanting
to give children the attention, education, and support they need in
difficult times, genuine health reasons etc., all providing that the
spouses agree: a broader set of conditions than those specified by
Qasimi (Rabbani 2005). Like Qasimi, Rabbani excludes sterilization,
but ‘because of the general impermissibility of “changing” the human
body’, noting that this opinion derives from the same texts that render
cosmetic surgery generally impermissible.9
Tahir Mahmood’s starkly contrasting argument is an extended
critique of Maudu¯d¯ı and clerics adopting a similar stance (Mahmood
1977).10 A verse in Sura 17 in the Qur’a¯n Shar¯ıf [Ba¯n¯ı Isra¯¯ıl or Children
of Israel] commands Muslims not to slay their children out of fear
of want: infanticide is a great sin and Allah will provide for all.
Some readings equate contraception with killing the unborn children
whom Allah has written into one’s fate. Mahmood contends that
Muslims should interpret the Qur’a¯n Shar¯ıf in light of contemporary
concerns: this verse, he insists, forbids murder (not contraception)
and ‘azl should include all pre-conception contraceptive techniques.11
9 We thank Fareeha Khan for these references. When she asked Rabbani to clarify
his position he replied: “The opinion I gave is more liberal than the Deobandi
position (classical and contemporary), but is more representative of (a) Arab Hanafi
scholarship; (b) what the texts seem to state; (c) what I feel is closer to the needs and
circumstances of people.” (Fareeha Khan, personal communication, 25May 2006).
10 Mahmood is an academic lawyer and one-time Chairman of India’s National
Commission for Minorities.
11 Likewise, Dawood considers that this injunction refers only to the pre-Islamic
practice of female infanticide (Dawood 1968: 231).
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People’s livelihoods are divine gifts that require effort, not idle
submission to nature. Contrary to Maudu¯d¯ı, contraception is not a
western imposition and it is better to rear small numbers of ‘good
Muslims’ than numerous ill-kempt children. Mahmood also discusses
several prominent IndianMuslims—clerics, lawyers, politicians—who
advocated family planning and saw no contradictions with Islamic
precepts, including Maulana Azad and Dr Zakir Husain (Mahmood
1977: 70ff.). Similarly, Asghar Ali Engineer considers that Muslims
should subject contraception to the same searching interrogation or
ijtiha¯d [interpretative thinking] that enables them to respond to any
social change. He defines ‘azl as contraception in general, rather
than coitus interruptus, and concludes that contraception is usually
permissible (Engineer 2005: 98–110). Advocating contraception,
however, is extremely controversial, as witness the spat between
leading figures in the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board. In late
2004, Maulana Kalbe Sadiq, vice-president of the AIMPLB made a
statement in favour of family planning: he was roundly contradicted
by Sayyid Muhammad Rabe Hasani Nadvi, the AIMPLB President,
and contributors to the subsequent debate in the Urdu newspaper
Rashtriya Sahara (Sikand 2005a). Sadiq re-entered the fray by insisting
that Islam requiresMuslims to be ‘rational’ and that family planning is
not contrary to Islamic principles (Times of India, 4December 2005).
In other words, the same theological sources can lead to
diametrically opposed conclusions about the permissibility of
contraception in Islam. But how do these matters play out on the
ground?
The Bijnor context
Bijnor district in north-western Uttar Pradesh rates relatively highly
on most economic indicators, but its social indicators—such as
literacy—are more modest: it ranked 57th of the 63 districts in UP
(Singh 2001 Table 8.3), with a literacy rate of 47% for females over 7
and of 70% for males (Registrar General & Census Commissioner of
India 2002). Literacy levels in rural areas and amongst the poor are
generally lower than the aggregate figures.
At nearly 42% of the total, the district’s Muslim population is
unusually sizeable (comprising about a third of the district’s rural
population and over two–thirds of its urban population) (Registrar
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General & Census Commissioner of India 2004). Some villages have
exclusively Hindu orMuslim populations, others aremixed. Jhakri, for
instance, has an all-Muslim population (663 in 2002). Muslims are
underrepresented in formal schooling in Bijnor district (Jeffery et al.
2005; Jeffery and Jeffery 2006; Jeffery et al. 2007), and, as elsewhere
in UP, Muslims in Bijnor district have lower literacy rates than
the aggregate figures and they are disproportionately concentrated
towards the bottom of the urban and rural economic hierarchies
(Ali and Sikand 2006; Khalidi 2006; Sachar 2006; Shariff 1995).
Moreover, Muslims are not as politically influential in Bijnor district
as their numbers might suggest (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006: 13ff).
The overwhelming majority of Muslims in the district are Sunni.
Moreover, the Daru’l ‘Ulu¯m seminary in Deoband, in neighbouring
Saharanpur district, exercises a decisive influence: the current vice-
chancellor is from a prominent family in Bijnor town and there are
many links between Bijnor and the seminary. There is a negligible
presence of Barelwis. Local madrasahs have direct links to Deoband:
inspections by Deoband staff, despatching some senior pupils there
to study, or recruiting teaching staff [maulw¯ıs] from Deoband itself
or from other madrasahs within its ambit. For instance, the ima¯m in
Jhakri runs a small madrasah: he studied at the Maza¯hir-i ‘Ulu¯m in
Saharanpur, an offshoot of Daru’l ‘Ulu¯m. Many maulw¯ıs originate from
Bijnor district itself, some from relatively poor urban backgrounds,
others from rural households (usually ones owning small amounts of
land). A few are from impoverished families in places such as eastern
UP and Bihar and have studied in boarding madrasahs since childhood.
Like the Muslim villagers we talked to, the maulw¯ıs are convinced that
Muslim ambitions in the wider world are routinely thwarted. Most
could not have afforded to obtain high educational qualifications in
the Hindi-medium schooling system: the madrasah sector had provided
a cheap or even free route to respectable—though rarely lucrative—
employment that they believe would otherwise have eluded them.12
The numbers of rural girls and boys attending local madrasahs have
risen substantially since the early 1990s, although most have ceased
attending by the age of 12 or so. In Begawala, about a kilometre from
Jhakri, pupil numbers exceed 1000, and several smaller madrasahs
serve other nearby villages. Maulw¯ıs play a conspicuous role in the
12 For a more general account of madrasahs in contemporary India, see Sikand
(2005b).
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‘civilizing mission’ with respect to their pupils—bodily cleanliness,
refined speech and punctuality, so familiar from accounts of reform
movements in north India (cf. Jeffery et al. 2004, 2005, 2006).
Madrasah curricula do not explicitly address family planning. Some
maulw¯ıs, however, are also ima¯ms in village mosques, and are often
asked to answer moral problems. Further, the Tabligh¯ı Jama‘at was
hardly a presence in rural Bijnor until the early 1990s: nowadays,
though, tabligh¯ı parties make periodic tours to villages—including
Jhakri—and adult Muslim villagers have increasingly been exposed
to their instruction.
Nevertheless, despite the increased reach of such educational
activities, few adults in Jhakri can read Urdu or Hindi with facility,
let alone Arabic. And, aside from creating problems for accessing
employment, low literacy compromises the reform agenda, which rests
so heavily on individual self-improvement. So what is the relationship
between Islamic teachings and fertility behaviour? How do Jhakri
residents’ views on contraception relate to all this clerical outreach?
A recent commentary on the demographic transition notes that
contraceptive behaviour at the grassroots has often been conspicuously
adrift from e´lite debates (Szreter et al. 2003). Further, Obermeyer
argues that ‘we do not clearly understand . . . how changes in
ideology affect the choices women make—or do not make—and how
alternatives are translated into the behaviours of individual women’
(Obermeyer 1994: 71). The case of Taranam and Talib provides a
vista from which to begin exploring these questions.13
Talib and Taranam
Talib’s 0.16 hectares of land provides little income, and the household
basically relies upon his wood trading business. He earns around
Rs 6,000–7,000 each month, a good sum for an uneducated village
man. In the first nine years of their marriage, Taranam had had
eight conceptions, including three miscarriages. In 1998, her eighth
pregnancy resulted in obstructed labour: she was taken to hospital,
where Talib instructed the doctor to sterilize her—and the girl born
13 We use pseudonyms throughout this paper; people who figure in our earlier
publications have their original pseudonyms. All quotations have been translated by
the authors.
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by caesarean section survived only a few hours. The medical costs had
amounted to Rs16,000.
When we first asked Taranam about the nasband¯ı [sterilization], her
response seemed surprisingly casual. ‘If it is forbidden, what then? My
health was bad and the doctor was saying there was no chance that
I’d survive another delivery. My health in general was bad and when
I became pregnant I had a cough and fever. And I’d also had several
miscarriages.’ Yetwhenwemet themboth later, amuchmore complex
picture emerged. Shaila and Patricia were talking to Taranam and to
Talib’s married niece [eBD] about family planning when Talib came
in and sat down beside Taranam.14 He immediately joined in the
conversation. According to Talib, most villagers are boorish [gawa¯r]
and illiterate people [ja¯hil log], who believe that having more children
will generate more income:
Talib: But that’s not true. Earnings are getting less and the eaters are
becoming more. You’ve heard about my niece’s children. One is ‘making
beards’ [barbering], another is riding a rickshaw and another is ‘digging
grass’ [doing nothing useful]. If there were fewer children, they wouldn’t be
doing this useless work . . . .Howwill amazdu¯r [labourer] feed 10–12 children?
People here don’t think that chhota¯ pariva¯r sukha¯ pariva¯r hoga¯ [‘a small family
will be a contented family’, the Indian family planning slogan].
Patricia: But people in the village say that children are Allah’s gift [Allah k¯ı
den] and that they shouldn’t stop them coming.
Talib burst out laughing: Children aren’t Allah’s gift! People are saying
incorrect things! They [children] are a man’s gift [a¯dm¯ı k¯ı den] and if a person
wishes, then he won’tmake any children.15 Howevermany children he wishes,
those he can make. If there are few children, then you can do everything. But
villagers don’t think of this comfort. Bas, they close their eyes and keep on
making children and don’t do anything else!
Being sterilized is a great sin, Talib continued, because it is not
permitted according to hadis: when a sterilized woman dies, he
asserted, her funeral prayers cannot be said and she will not be blessed
when she goes ‘above’. We asked what would happen to Taranam,
since Talib had agreed to her sterilization whilst she was under an
14 This discussion was in February 2003. Shaila took detailed notes at the time,
wrote up in Hindi, and Patricia translated them into English. This abridged account
excludes our discussion of the importance of having children (especially sons), a
significant influence on family planning decisions that often arose in discussions in
Jhakri, along with the financial troubles generated by emergency medical care.
15 Although a¯dm¯ı also means a ‘person’ unmarked by gender, we have translated it
as ‘man’ since this accords with Talib’s meaning here.
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anaesthetic. Taranam said she would not have agreed if she had
been conscious and Talib butted in to say that Taranam had done
nothing wrong and the sin would all rest on him. Nevertheless, he
insisted, it was the correct decision for them. They had few children
and were living peacefully. ‘I’m thankful to Allah that we’re living
very well, the children and the two of us. Whatever the children need,
I bring immediately. If the children have asked for Rs50 shoes, then
I’ll bring them and they’ll last for 6 months and then I bring some
more. And if I had 10–12 children, I’d be bringing shoes for Rs2–4
that break the very moment they arrive at the house! So having few
children gives this benefit.’ In any case, the doctor told him that any
future children would have to be delivered by ‘operation’ [caesarean
section]. ‘I thought that her [Taranam’s] health would be damaged
and where would I get so much money from? I thought, “today I have
Rs16,000, but tomorrow if I don’t, then she’ll die.” That’s why I agreed
to the [nasband¯ı] operation.’ Certainly, he admitted, other people in
the village had criticized him for the decision, but his riposte was
robust:
Why should I listen to what anyone says? I have to bring the children up
and if she [Taranam] were to die like Razia did, what would happen to
my house? . . .Women don’t understand that this [childbirth] is women’s
death. Just look at Razia. She herself died in giving birth. And behind her,
her children are worried and her husband is also worried. She’d had 11–
12 children and there was no life in her body. She’d become weak. There’s a
great advantage in having few children. Razia from my village died because
of poverty. There were only the women of the house beside her and they had
called a da¯¯ı [traditional birth attendant]. But if they had taken Razia to town
sooner, then she, bicha¯r¯ı [poor thing], wouldn’t have died.
Taranam, however, was not convinced by Talib’s argument: people
who are sterilized have made a calculation that is ‘correct for this
world but not correct for that world. In that world, we shall have to
answer questions about why we closed off having children . . . .Razia
saw nothing of this world, but she’ll be very happy in that world. She’ll
be in paradise [jannat].’
Shaila was startled: Razia will be in jannat, but where will her
children be?
Taranam: You and we are just sinners thinking that. This world is only for a
short time, so what is there to think about it?
Patricia: But don’t people have to think about it a bit?
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Talib: That’s right. You have to think about this world. You should also think
about what will happen to your children after you’re gone. Allah Miya¯n has
also sent us to this world to live a good life here. So, bhai, we also think about
this world.
Taranam: I think about that world and you are all thinking about this world.
Shaila: Which thinking is more correct?
Taranam: Look, ji, you should think about both worlds. But after you die, what
will happen? You should think of that first of all. Like you’re writing: if there’s
some mistake in what you’re writing, then you ask again. You correct your
error. Our calculation is in the samemanner, that Allah is writing everything
up above and if we’ve done anything wrong, then he’ll ask why we’ve done
this wrong thing. So that’s why we think about that world more. When a child
does something wrong, then its mother will punish it. Allah’s calculation is
like that too. If we do anything wrong, Allah will certainly punish us.
Talib: But Allah also looks at necessity [majbu¯r¯ı]. If someone’s throat is being
cut and if their life can be saved by our telling one lie, then Allah will forgive
that lie. And if we’ve just lied for no reason, that won’t be forgiven.
Taranam: Everything is calculated in Allah’s house and sinful people will go
to hell [doza¯q] and women like Razia will go to paradise [jannat]. That poor
thing finished off her life, and she’s become ‘beloved of Allah’ [because he
summoned her].
Talib: She has become ‘beloved of Allah’ but she’s left her children behind
crying.
Ambiguities of village voices
Talib and Taranam’s concerns parallel ones that have echoed through
our conversations about childbearing over two decades in Jhakri and
rural Bijnor more generally: the impossibility of rearing numerous
children properly, and the damage to women’s health of repeated
childbearing, fears about maternal mortality, the costs of medical
interventions in childbearing—all jostling with anxieties about what
counts as ‘necessity’ and how behaviour in this world affects a person’s
destiny in the afterlife.
Razia’s death in childbirth in 2002 provided a focal point to which
women’s thoughts repeatedly returned. One day in 2003, Irfana, with
7 living children from 10 pregnancies, told us:
My spirit is filled up [‘fed up’] with children. I have lots of distress [giving
birth] and now I’m also becoming afraid in case some other ailment comes
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up. Recently, Razia died. Just half of her child’s arm had appeared outside.
She had a great deal of trouble and the poor thing died. That’s why I’m very
fearful . . . .Thinking about Razia, I become very sad, because the poor thing
never saw any of the celebrations for her children [their marriages, the birth
of their children]. In giving birth to that child, she must be ‘beloved of Allah’,
poor thing.
Her neighbour Nargis chipped in scornfully: ‘Women here don’t
think about whether they’ll live or die. They just need children, no
matterwhat happens. Razia died and even so thewomenhaven’t learnt
a lesson [sabaq].’ One young woman complained disgustedly about
the short gaps between her children [‘sab tale-u¯par ke hain’: they were
all born pell-mell]. Another mentioned her sister, who was pregnant
again, yet her oldest daughter was already due to be married:
Her husband is like a maula¯na¯.16 That’s why there’s a paltan [platoon] of
children in the house! I don’t like having many children. It’s not within my
capacity to bring up many children.
Yet another expressed her views like this:
Everyone in the village has 8–10 children. They have to do all the work for
them. With ten children, if you wash the face of one, another remains dirty.
If you wash the second one’s face, the third one remains dirty. With so many
children, there is a lot of food to be cooked, there are lots of clothes to be
washed and the house will also be dirty all the time . . . .There’s no benefit at
all from 10–12 children.
And, during her 12th pregnancy, another woman delivered this
spirited commentary:
Here they get peoplemarried at 14–15 years and then you have ‘vile hardship’
[a¯fat gand¯ı ho ja¯]. There are 10–10, 12–12 children. You can neither look after
yourself nor the children. You can’t flourish. Just as you’ve cared for one,
another is born. The ‘vile hardship’ continues. How can a person flourish?
Several women begged Allah to prevent further pregnancies [band
kara¯-de] or talked about intending tomake some ‘arrangements’ or said
they had ‘caught hold of their ears’ [vowed not to have another child].
Yet women’s comments about excessive childbearing and childrearing
have not translated into high levels of contraceptive use, which rose
from around 1% in the 1980s to around 6% in the late 1990s.17 Jhakri
16 Maula¯na¯ literally means a judge, but is widely used in a derogative or derisory
fashion to denote someone who is excessively pious and strict.
17 This is significantly lower than for comparable Hindus in neighbouring
Dharmnagri.
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women rarely adopt ‘modern’ contraceptivemethods and sterilization,
in particular, remains very uncommon—aside fromTaranam, just two
Jhakri women were sterilized during the 1990s.18
One was Najma, who had nine pregnancies but only four surviving
children. By 1990, her supportive mother-in-law had died, an eye
injury had badly affected her eyesight and she was in poor general
health. She had nasband¯ı ‘just because I was angry’. Nevertheless, she
had to endure the scorn of neighbours and relatives (Jeffery and Jeffery
1996: 53–68). In 2003, Najma claimed that some women nowadays
are being sterilized ‘chup ke se’ [secretly]. Shaila asked if this was
not pointless, since Allah knows everything. Najma’s sister’s daughter
Mehmuna agreed, saying that women seemed more afraid of people
than of Allah. And she confirmed that her mother had indeed been
angry with Najma, because ‘nasband¯ı is considered bad’, ‘there will
not be any forgiveness [bakhshish] and their funeral prayers will not
be recited.’ Najma retorted ‘what would I have done with so many
children? If there had been more children, there would have been
nothing to eat and nothing to wear!’ Mehmuna agreed:
There’s no benefit in having many children. Nowadays it’s said that “a small
family is a contented family and a large family is troubled” . . . . If there’s a
small family, there will be less dukh-takl¯ıf [misery-distress] . . . .With a small
family, there’s money in the hand and good food and drink. In a small family,
there is complete peace.
Despite endorsing small families, however,Mehmuna then provided
an elaborate account of the sinfulness of being sterilized:
One time some village woman went on hajj . . . .Afterwards, a voice comes
from above to say if the hajj has been accepted or not. This time, the voice
said that the hajj hadn’t been accepted . . . .The hajj of all the people there
wasn’t accepted. So then they all started saying that their pilgrimage hadn’t
been accepted because of someone amongst them and everyone was searched.
Then one woman was found who had done nasband¯ı and everyone said that
their hajj hadn’t taken place because of this woman. So someone told that
woman to go and lick a large stone there with her tongue. That woman went
and licked the stone and three grubs emerged from her tongue. And everyone
said that these grubs are the souls of three children. If she hadn’t had the
operation done, she’d have had threemore children. So this woman had killed
three children and that was why the hajj didn’t take place.
18 A few women reported attempting abortions (generally by oral medication), not
always successfully.
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A few women said all contraception is against Islam. More often,
though, Jhakri women said only sterilization is forbidden and that
other methods—pills, injections, IUCDs—are permitted. Jamila, for
instance, had used ‘Mala-D’ oral contraceptives and currently has a
Copper-T [IUCD].19 She had 8 living children. In large families, she
argued, the plight of the youngest children is bleak, especially once
the parents have died, because no one (including their older siblings)
would look after them properly:
But we’re Muslims and that’s why we couldn’t do nasband¯ı . . . .You’ll know
that when someone has nasband¯ı, the funeral prayers can’t be said. Hindus
have one or two children and then have nasband¯ı. They educate those two
children properly, and feed them well. But with us, this thing is completely
forbidden and that’s why there are many children . . . .But just see, we have
no matlab [interest] in this world. We shouldn’t be thinking about it . . . .We
are just like a guest in someone’s house: no matter how long guests stay in
your house, one day they’ll have to go to their own homes . . . .Life here is
only for a few days. At the very most it will be 100 years . . . .Then we have to
show our faces to Allah. In the next life, this life will seem like a dream. The
life there will be for eternity.
Just a handful of women thought otherwise. The third woman
sterilized during the 1990s was embarrassed to be pregnant when
her oldest children were already young adults. After a failed abortion
attempt, she had nasband¯ı. ‘People say that their funeral prayers
won’t be accepted,’ she said, ‘but really it isn’t forbidden. There’s
no prohibition. If you want to do it, you can. We thought, “Allah
will do just what he was going to do—but what would I do being so
embarrassed?”’ And when we commented to one young woman that
many people consider that sterilization is against Islam, she promptly
retorted: ‘And if you’ve produced10–12 children and youhaven’tmade
even one of them d¯ın-da¯r [religious], then what’s the benefit of 10–12
children? That’s why, if there are 2–3 children you can look after them
properly.’
Like Talib, then, many Jhakri women voiced opposition to large
families. But Talib’s ‘this-worldly’ calculations about providing
adequate food, clothes and education for his children led to his
unusual decision to permit Taranam’s nasband¯ı. And he was scornful
about ja¯hil [ignorant] people unwilling to do likewise. But Taranam’s
19 For more on Jamila, see Jeffery and Jeffery (1996: 201–215). Many women in
rural Bijnor believe that Mala-D causes garm¯ı [‘heat’, in the humoral sense] in a
woman’s head, and that the Copper-T is liable to rise up into a woman’s abdomen or
chest.
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worries about ‘that world’ find their echoes in other women’s views of
sterilization.
Authoritative voices of local Islam
During conversations with Muslim clerics in Bijnor town, its rural
hinterland and in Daru’l ‘Ulu¯m in Deoband, we explained that village
women often lament the strain that childbearing puts on household
budgets and their own health, yet feared the consequences of using
contraception.We asked if contraception is always sinful or sometimes
permissible, what happened to people in the afterlife if they adopted
contraception, and whether Allah accepts the funeral prayers of the
sterilized.
All the clerics said that Muslims should not normally limit their
fertility. Several referred us to Sura 17 in theQur’a¯n Shar¯ıf (see above).
The manager of the Begawala madrasah explained it this way:
It’s like murder! Look, it’s completely forbidden, because the person who
gives us our daily bread [rizq] is Allah. It isn’t true that those who have many
children are poor and those who have one or two children are rich, they
are also very poor. I could show you so many examples in the neighbouring
villages of people with 1–2 children who are poor. So whatever daily income
Alla¯h-ta‘a¯la¯ has written, that much will be received. If we kill our children
because of fear of daily bread, this will be very wrong, because Allah is the
giver of daily bread.
People can beg forgiveness for a wrong of their own doing, he said,
but destroying something that God has made is unforgivable: ‘God
gives breath to humanity and later he takes it back to himself. So now
you understand this: humanity hasn’t made humanity and therefore
humanity hasn’t been given the right to kill it.’
Likewise, the senior Muft¯ı at Deoband asserted:
It is written in Islam that however many children you have is a matter of good
fortune [khush nas¯ıb¯ı]. However many descendants are born will be correct
[sava¯b], because the master of our daily bread is Allah, who made both you
and me . . . .He alone feeds us here and you as well. He nourishes the whole
world. So what’s the need to worry? Don’t destroy your offspring for fear of
daily bread . . . . If you don’t sow seeds, how will there be a crop? . . .And if
there are no children, how will the world flourish? People are the world’s
lustre.
Several clerics also linked contraception with unwelcome social
changes. In terms reminiscent of Maudu¯d¯ı, the qa¯z¯ı in Bijnor town
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lamented that people are freer now than previously and dissoluteness
[a¯va¯rag¯ı] has spread:
Ever since people took these precautions, society has taken the wrong path.
From that, religious faith has also gone wrong. And from the society’s point
of view, people do wrong because they know nothing will happen since they
have taken precautions.
Similarly, the Deoband Muft¯ı denounced contemporary society: the
illegitimate children born because of people’s wrong-thinking [ghalat
soch], who will have the same faults as their parents, today’s men who
just need pleasure [lazzat] and bodily enjoyment [jisma¯n¯ı maza] and
indulge in relationships for which Islam has no place: ‘Behaving like
that is a very serious sin [sakht guna¯h] . . . .Marriages have been laid
down in the shar¯ıat so that . . . you will not think about some other man
or woman.’
Several clerics, however, added a rider to their comments: family
planning would not be sinful in situations of majbu¯r¯ı [compulsion,
helplessness, constraint, powerlessness]. In real life, favouring one
Islamic principle may necessarily infringe another equally significant
one. If people are majbu¯r, contraception can be permitted—when
there are mitigating circumstances, Thanawi’s ‘legitimate excuse’
or Rabbani’s ‘sound reasons’. And precisely how majbu¯r¯ı is delimited
leaves some space for interpretative and behavioural flexibility. The
DeobandMuft¯ı, for instance, gave several guidelines for judging when
contraception (including sterilization) is permissible:
Our Gracious Prophet says that children are God’s exceptionally valuable
[besh-q¯ımat¯ı] gifts. But for the sake of a woman’s health or for some other
majbu¯r¯ı it is better that a further child not be born . . . .Many people come,
saying that a doctor has told them that there is a danger to life and so they
should have the operation . . . . I ask them to bring the written opinion of the
doctor, and when I see that I give permission.
In his view, however, straitened circumstances and food shortage,
whether actual or feared, could not justify contraceptive use.
Yet, apparently contradicting this, he said contraception would be
permissible if the government orders people to limit their fertility, and
if a man would lose his employment unless he or his wife is sterilized:
‘Because if he loses his job, what will he eat, how will he look after
his wife and children?’ If the government tries to enforce the slogan
‘ham do, hama¯re do’ [we two, our two], Muslims should mobilize and
try to delay it as much as possible. ‘But, if ham do, hama¯re do became
compulsory [majbu¯r],’ the Muft¯ı continued, ‘Muslims would have to
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obey the government. They can be sterilized if there is majbu¯r¯ı, when
there is no other remedy [cha¯ra] . . . .Please understand that in our
Islam if something is understood as majbu¯r, if there is majbu¯r¯ı, then
things that are not permitted can become permitted.’ How, then, did
the clerics interpret villagers’ beliefs that funeral prayers cannot be
recited for people who have been sterilized? A maulw¯ı at the Begawala
madrasah commented:
Look, if there is majbu¯r¯ı and no option except the operation, then in those
circumstances the operation is allowed. And the funeral prayers can certainly
be recited, because people commit very big sins and even so their funeral
prayers are said . . . .Whether the funeral prayers are acceptable or not, that
has not been written. In the Qur’a¯n Shar¯ıf it has been written that if there
is some necessity those things that are not permitted become permitted—
like the operation is not permitted. But if there is some necessity, then that
forbidden thing becomes permitted.
Similarly, the Deoband Mufti emphasized repentance and for-
giveness whilst contradicting the villagers’ beliefs:
It isn’t written anywhere in the Qur’a¯n Shar¯ıf that any man or woman cannot
have their funeral prayers recited if they havehad nasband¯ı. If someonehas had
nasband¯ı and they beg forgiveness it will certainly be accepted. Bas, the Shariat
states that before you die, you should repent your sins [tauba karna¯] . . . .But
ignorance spreads in the world. People who are ignorant say things about
funeral prayers being unacceptable. They have no knowledge about whether
it is true or not. They don’t have the learning about this. So from ignorance
these people say these topsy-turvy things. Look, nomaulw¯ı ormuft¯ı, no-onewho
knows about Islam, could have told them such things. People place their trust
in rumours [sun¯ı-suna¯¯ı]. Then they wander about and send these rumours
wandering even further.
Clerics in Deoband and Bijnor do not speak with a single voice
about contraception, any more than villagers do. Yet the clerics’
understanding that people sometimes face majbu¯r¯ı, and that Allah
is merciful to those who have repented present a contrast with the
uncompromisingly harsh views of many villagers about the sterilized
person’s fate. This mismatch undermines assumptions that the rural
masses are slavish followers of their religious leaders. Despite Tabligh¯ı
tours in rural Bijnor, much of the reform agenda has not taken an
effective hold there. Indeed, calm domestic order and cleanliness
are not readily compatible with everyday rural life (cf. Jeffery et al.
2004). Rural children usually attend madrasahs for only a few years
(at most): madrasah staff often lament that the fragile impression they
make on their pupils’ self-discipline in cleanliness, speech, routine
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and punctuality is liable to reversal once pupils return to the village
atmosphere (Jeffery et al. 2005, 2006). Thus, we should question how
central the reform agenda is in the mundane lives of rural Muslims in
Bijnor.
Situating fertility
Greenhalgh emphasizes the importance of showing how fertility
‘makes sense given the socio-cultural and political economic context
in which it is embedded’ and of seeing fertility transitions as
‘products of changes in class-specific opportunity structures in
response to transformations of global and regional political economies’
(Greenhalgh 1995: 17, 21). Similarly, for Obermeyer ‘the political
context is a key factor for understanding the way in which [Islamic]
religious doctrine is interpreted’ (Obermeyer 1994: 59).
These insights are germane here. Muslim villagers’ contraceptive
practice is certainly coloured by what they believe to be ‘Islamic
doctrine’. But, as we have shown, ‘Islamic doctrine’ on contraception
is not monolithic. Consequently, privileging apparently theological
issues will lead us astray. Rather, a more compelling account is yielded
by focusing on rural Muslims’ ‘secular’ concerns: economic and social
marginalization, the Indian government’s family planning programme
and communal politics, and the political economy of hopelessness
(cf. Jeffery and Jeffery 2006).
Social and economic marginalization
Despite their numerical strength in Bijnor district, Muslims do not
dominate the local economy or politics. Crucially, moreover, Muslims
in rural Bijnor also perceive themselves as economically and socially
marginalized (Jeffery et al. 2007; Jeffrey et al. 2004). Jamila, for
instance, explained the lack of Muslim doctors this way:
You see, Muslims are poor and no one gives them any help. But the
government helps Hindus. Even if Muslims educate their children, they still
won’t get ‘service’. A Hindu will get ‘service’ and will have earnings, so he’ll
give his children food on time, he’ll cook good food to eat and he’ll educate
them in a good school and pay out money for the books. Since the ‘service’
is good, they’ll make expenditures. And when children receive education,
then they may become doctors. But Muslim children don’t get their food on
time and the government doesn’t help Muslims. So tell me, how can Muslim
children become doctors? . . .Whoever has money is making their children
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into doctors, whether the children have the capability [qa¯bil¯ıyat] inside them
or not.
Similarly, Latifan commented that Muslims do not benefit from
education because they do not obtain ‘service’ afterwards. Her
neighbour added that this is why Muslim boys do not study, and ‘you
spend so much money on education and even the money that you have
savedwill also be spent—and still youwill not get ‘service’. Rather than
that, you should spend themoney that you have saved on starting some
business.’ A widespread view is that without social contacts to exert
influence [‘source’ or sifa¯rish] or money to bribe the personnel making
appointments [‘force’], employment will not materialize—even for
someone with educational credentials. Jabruddin asserted:
No one values Muslims. Hindus obtain employment in a single breath, but
not Muslims . . . .That’s why Muslims aren’t educating their children. They
know that they won’t get employment—and there is this damage, that a boy
won’t be willing to do farm work. He won’t want to pick up the sickle. So the
unfortunate Muslim is worried just about this: he’s poor. Should he feed his
children or spend money on educating them?
By contrast, madrasah teachers generally saw inherent value in
education, yet they too perceived discrimination against even well-
educated Muslims and the need to bribe officials when seeking
employment. Whilst some madrasah teachers felt called to perform
work that brings religious merit, others had turned to madrasah
teaching because of financial distress and frustrated ambitions—and
because madrasah employment can be obtained without bribes. One
Begawala madrasah teacher said he had been unable to study further
because of financial worries:
I had already tried to get other ‘service’, but to no benefit. So then I took
the ‘service’ here [in the madrasah] . . . .Enough! There were worries in the
house—our situation [ha¯la¯t] was not good. I had to give daily bread to my wife
and children. I had to show them consideration.
One of his colleagues turned to madrasah teaching because his older
brother failed to fulfil their father’s ambition to have a son highly
educated in religious matters. Only after we pressed him did he
comment:
Listen!With respect to worldlymatters, I’m not happy . . . . I don’t havemoney
because in this ‘line’ there isn’tmuchmoney.Now I have just one job: to please
Allah. If there’s nothing forme here, then I pray to Allah that I will receivemy
reward up there. Look, as far as worldly matters are concerned, I’m certainly
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not happy . . . .Today, if I were doing something else—for example ‘service’—
then I’d have more money. When I consider my financial position, I’m not
happy.
Population, the Indian state and communal politics
During the political Emergency (1975–1977), the government’s
population programme took a markedly coercive turn after health
workers and other government employees were disciplined if they
failed to meet family planning ‘targets’, particularly sterilization.
There was unparalleled public debate—and widespread distrust of
government health workers. Nearly 30 years later, the DeobandMuft¯ı
commented:
Sanjay [Gandhi] captured people and did nasband¯ı on them. People were on
journeys by bus and they were dragged out and sterilized. There was great
tyranny [zulm] then.
Throughout our Bijnor research, Muslims have believed they were
the particular targets of family planning workers and they especially
resented the pressure to adopt a technique they believe is contrary
to Islam. For Muslims, high caste Hindu domination of health care
provision, government and private alike, undermines the state’s
legitimacy and some even suggested there was a government initiative
to eradicate Muslims. Furthermore, the hate-speech of Hindutva
ideologues has a long and infamous genealogy: building on the
‘common wisdom’ about Muslims’ untrustworthiness and lack of
patriotism, family planning issues have been increasingly politicized
along communal lines (Basu 1996, 1997; Jeffery and Jeffery 2006).
In September 2003, the release of (uncorrected) statistics from the
2001 census created a furore overMuslim fertility, which the corrected
statistics released later did little to quieten (Bhat and Zavier 2005;
Jeffery and Jeffery 2006; Jeffery and Jeffery 2000, 2005; Rajan 2005).
Moreover, Muslims’ sense of economic insecurity is compounded
by the rise of Hindutva politics during the 1990s. In 1990, there
were serious disturbances in Bijnor town related to the Babri mosque
dispute (Basu 1995; Jeffery and Jeffery 1994), whilst the anti-Muslim
pogroms in Gujarat in 2002 (Varadarajan 2002) generated fearful
commentaries from villagers and madrasah staff alike. In March 2002,
Patricia asked a Begawala maulw¯ı about the on-going communal
violence in Gujarat. After commenting on rumours that madrasahs are
weapons arsenals and that Muslims are traitors, he continued:
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You have come here several times. You come without warning. Have you ever
seen any work of this sort going on? Where are we giving training in shooting
guns? Here there is not the money for food to eat, so where shall we get
bullets? Those people who say that there are arms in madrasahs, that there
are ISI agents [Pakistani spies]—they should go just once and catch them
and bring them forward. To this day, not a single recovery of arms has been
made in any mosque or madrasah. No one has been caught. Our reputation is
being destroyed. But we remain silent. These are false accusations. People
talk. Let them talk. We cannot reply. We are weak. We remain quiet and
silent . . . .These people are getting us killed. Straight off, they are getting
us ‘fried’ by bullets. The PAC [Provincial Armed Constabulary] is pursuing
Muslims tenaciously . . . .Theywant to finishMuslims off. But they can’t finish
us off by firing 100–50 bullets.
Political economy of hopelessness
The Indian state’s complicity with Hindutva-inspired anti-Muslim
violence—active participation by some officials, incitement by
others—has seriously compromised rural Muslims’ willingness
to rely on state protection. Communal biases in health care
provision (especially family planning) and problems accessing secure
employment amplify their mistrust. It is, then, unremarkable that
Muslim parents in rural Bijnor sense their powerlessness to plan
their futures—a condition that is captured by the notion of a political
economy of hopelessness, in which people at the bottom of extremely
inequitable social systems realistically believe that they cannot exert
much control over their lives (Appadurai 2004; Jeffery and Jeffery
2006: 128ff; Popkin 1980; Scott 1985). Implicit here, however, is a
presumption that social and economic changes could provide Muslim
parents with incentives to invest in the education of a small number
of children. It is instructive here to consider countries where Muslim
clerics have been involved—in various ways and to different extents—
in government-sponsored population programmes.
Sometimes we commented on how family planning is actively
promoted in Bangladesh. Jamila was adamant:
Such people can’t beMuslims . . . . Just calling yourself aMuslim doesn’tmake
you a Muslim. We’re certainly uneducated. We don’t know which child was
born onwhich date. But we do knowwhat is in our Islam andwhat is forbidden.
Similarly, the Deoband Muft¯ı said Bangladesh had been incorrect
to normalize sterilization:
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Islam is the same everywhere. It cannot be changed . . . . If someone gives me
Rs 10 lakhs and I sell myself—that is a sinful matter. If because of greed for
money, I give a false fatwa, then the punishment [‘aza¯b] will be upon me.
By contrast, however, one of his colleagues commented (out of his
hearing):
People must change with the times. For example, it used not to be allowed to
use a microphone for the aza¯n. On many matters, Egypt is ahead and allows
different things. People should have the children they can rear, but [in the
past] they did not.
Muslim fertility rates in different countries vary widely, however,
and there are no consistent differentials between Muslims and
their non-Muslim neighbours. Consequently, Jones and Karim argue,
presumptions about monolithic religious ideologies, or about ‘Islamic
contraceptive practice’, divert attention from the diverse contexts
to which Muslim clerics and others are responding (Jones and
Karim 2005). In Bangladesh, Muslim clerics have not opposed family
planning and sterilization to the same extent as in India. Indeed,
their stances shifted very rapidly when social and economic conditions
changed (Amin and Basu 2000; Amin et al. 1996; Caldwell et al.
1999). By the late 1980s, Bangladeshi Muslims generally believed
that family planning, including sterilization, was not contrary to Islam
(Bernhart and Uddin 1990), whilst clerical support for the state’s
family planning programme was crucial in the unprecedented and
dramatic decline (by 44%) in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) between
1980–1985 and 1995–2000 (Khuda 2005). In Pakistan, by contrast,
erratic government policy on family planning, the political influence
of Maudu¯d¯ı and the failure to co-opt Muslim clerics, accompany much
smaller declines in TFR than in Bangladesh (Hakim 2005). Popular
perceptions of religious leaders’ views on contraception are that
they are hostile (Ali and Ushijima 2005). In other Muslim-majority
countries, notable changes in fertility have occurred, sometimes
with clerical endorsement of contraception, sometimes without their
playing a central role (see, for example, papers in Jones and Karim
2005).
Of course, these are places where Muslims hold the reins of
government. By contrast, Muslims in rural Bijnor highlight the
role of Hindutva interests and the Indian state in their physical
vulnerability and social and economic marginalization. Since the early
1990s, moreover, Muslims in rural UP have been affected by changes
wrought by economic liberalization: squeezed household budgets,
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 20 Jun 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.188
DISPUTING CONTRACEPT ION 543
rising consumerism reflected in dowry demands, the burgeoning
market for private education and health care provision and moribund
state provision. Further, high fertility and declining mortality since
the 1960s have led to land fragmentation: those whose land once
provisioned their families now describe themselves as ‘neither farmer
nor labourer’ [na¯ kissa¯n, na¯ mazdu¯r] or as people just ‘managing to
survive’ [guzar-basar karnewale], whilst the landless or land-poor can
no longer rely on agricultural labouring. Young men increasingly
seek employment in Bijnor town, Delhi, Punjab, Kashmir or Surat,
generally in sectors where Muslims are already well placed (e.g.
machine embroidery, tailoring, house construction and painting,
barbering, vehicle maintenance and rickshaw pulling). Some—
especially craft work—have been particularly badly hit by economic
liberalization (Ali and Sikand 2006) and may not provide long-
term employment for rural migrants. Young women are still usually
married and experiencing childbearing in their mid-teens. There are
signs that young men are being married at later ages, however, and
some continue working outside Jhakri (probably with unintended
consequences for fertility).Whether these developmentsmight trigger
intentional fertility limitation is an open question, though.
Hopelessness may persist, whether because of continuing economic
marginalization or communal unrest—and urban employment might
increase young men’s contact with clerical hostility to contraception.
And, if hopelessness about life in this world predisposes people to avoid
behaviour they believe is sinful to guarantee a good life in Paradise,
declines in fertilitymay be slow and halting. Yet privileging supposedly
doctrinal views on contraception both obscures the diversity ofMuslim
opinion and side-steps how ordinary Muslims handle the exigencies
of daily life in a liberalizing and globalizing economy. Further,
despite interventions by prominent Muslim clerics and Hindutva
ideologues, Muslim fertility in UP, and India overall, has declined
markedly since the early 1990s. Tellingly, TFRs for Muslims in south
India are often lower even than for Hindus, leave aside Muslims,
in UP (Jeffery and Jeffery 2006: 33–35). The depressed social and
economic conditions of UP Muslims are undoubtedly significant in
this regional contrast. The Sachar report (2006) advocated numerous
policy interventions to ameliorate Muslims’ position and the UP and
central governments alike have pledged to implement the report’s
proposals. If Muslims’ situations improve, if hopefulnesswere to become
imaginable, Muslim fertility levels in UP would almost certainly
decline—not least because clerical hostility to contraception is not
buttressed by effective surveillance within the household. As people
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say, miya¯n b¯ıw¯ı ra¯z¯ı, kya¯ karega¯ qa¯z¯ı (husband and wife agree, so what
will the qa¯z¯ı do)?
Addendum:
As this paper was going to press, the ifta department atDeoband issued
a fatwa saying that it is permissible for Muslims to use temporary
contraceptives to space children and ensure that they are properly
nourished. The fatwa does not mention sterilisation, and several press
reports comment that Muslim clerics consider it forbidden to make
permanent changes to the body, unless the mother’s life is in danger.
(See, for instance, The Indian Express 16 January 2008 and the Times of
India 17 January 2008.)
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